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Beza and Melanchthon on Political

Obligation
EUGENE LINSE

M

artin Luther and John Calvin
thought of themselves not as philosophers or politicians, but first and last
as theologians and students of the Word
of God. Accordingly, we should not expect
to find them presenting a comprehensive
political philosophy or even a general
theory of politics, for they did not see this
as the task to which they were called.
Whatever each had to say about political
ideology or practice tended to be largely
theoretical and the consequence of first
principles rooted and grounded on theology. Of necessity both spoke of matters
pertaining to the nature and function of
politics, although their concern with politics was largely to define its proper sphere
and relationship to theology.1 While Luther and Calvin painted in large and theoretical strokes, it remained for their disciples, Melanchthon and Beza, to translate
the theory of the new theology of justification by faith and sanctification in love into
the realm of the practical and the political.
In the case of the German reformers, it
was Luther who was the pioneer,
the
1hon
creative genius, while Melanchthon was the
gentle scholar, the schoolmaster of all Ger-

1 On the political theories of Luther and
Calvin see Duncan B. Forrester, "Martin Luther
and John Calvin," in Hislor, of Poli1ic,,l Philosoph'J, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

T hB tl#lhor is p,o/Bssor of poliliul sciBncB 111
Concorllill CoUBgB, SI. Ptl#l,

many.2 It was largely through his orderly
and systematic presentations of Lutheran
theology in the successive editions of his
Loci Communes that Melanchthon, whose
inclination was to quiet and scholarly humanism, presented his carefully formulated
system of Christian doctrine.3 It is perhaps strange that these two men, who were
different in temperament, should feel so
warmly about each other.4
As Melanchthon, who survived Luther,
was responsible for the orderly development of Lutheranism in Germany, so the
future of Calvinism was committed to
2 Philip Schaff calls Luther "the man for the
people • • • unyielding and uncompromising
against Romanism and Zwinglianism: Melanchthon was always ready for compromise and
peace." Philip SchaH, Hislor, of lhB Chris1it,,,
Chu,eh, VI (New York: Scribner, 1916), 194.
Ernst Troeltscb describes the relative influence
of the two men aptly when he says: "It was not
Luther, but Melanchthon, who determined fully
what the exaa consistency of Lutheranism was
to be. He was the chief instructor and teacher
••. who passed Luther's ideas through the sieve
of his formulations." E. Troeltscb, V Bman/1 '"'"
O.itmbtJrang bn Job,mn
M•l4flebGtwh11rtl 11ntl
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1891), p . .58.
a The edition of the Lad Comm11n•s employed in this paper is found in Philipp M•l,mehlhons Werk•, ed. Friedrich August Koethe.
Translations from it are the author's.
4 "Melanchthon was the only humanist with
whom Luther ever came to terms and whom
he tolerated. We may even go so far as to •1
that he entered into an alliance with him." Franz
Minn.
Hildebrandt,
M•ltmcb1hon, A.liffl or A.U, (Cambridse: University Press, 1946) • p. :m.
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Theodore Beza in Geneva. Against the
background of persecution in France and
some uncertainty in Geneva growing out
of fear that the adherents of Calvin's reform would swfer reprisals if they defended their position, Beza developed a
practical political philosophy consistent
with the theology of his precursor and with
the troubled times to which it was directed.
Some have called Beza's Du tkoil des
magis1ra1s (De iure magis1,a111um, 1579)
poor theology and good politics. Others
have reversed the estimate. As Melanchthon's Loci was to serve as a practical guide
in developmental theology, so of necessity
the treatise D11 droil was conceived to answer the burning political question of its
day: What may a Christian do in legitimate defense of his person against aggression?
The fundamental premises out of which
the details and specific applications grow
are very much the same for Luther and
Calvin and for Melanchthon and Beza.
Both Luther and Calvin believe in the total
depravity of man, both hold to the doctrine of justification by faith alone, both
find in the Bible ultimate authority for
faith and life. In his approach to Scripture,
however, Luther insists that the main concern of Scripture is to proclaim salvation
in Christ. As far as life in this world is
concerned, he tends to believe that Scripture operates negatively and needs to be
supplemented to obtain an adequate ethic.
Calvin, on the other hand, tends to look
in Saipture for dear and specific rules
which the Christian is to obey. Essentially
these are also the positions of Melanchthon and Beza. As far as development of
a praaical course of action from a theo-
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logical principle is concerned, however,
Beza seems to follow more the Lutheran
inclination of supplementation than the
principle of specific rule as found in Calvin. Both Calvin and Luther assert that
man is subject to two kingdoms.Ii Man belongs both to this age and to the age to
come, to the temporal and the eternal
realms. He is subject to the secular law,
and he is the recipient of the eternal Gospel. He is a being capable both of reason
and of faith. He is both a member of the
church, the body of Christ, and at the
same time subject to the temporal authority
of secular magistrates and laws.

THB

THEOLOGICAL ORIBNTATI0N

OF MBLANCHTH0N AND BEZA

As is the case with Luther and Calvin,
so also in Beza and Melanchthon the point
of departure of their political theory is
theological. The first paragraph of Beza's
Du df'oil underscores this position by asserting that there is no other will than
that of God alone and that this will is
deserving of obedience without exception.8
Melanchthon does much the same thing
in his Loe; when in the 38th article, devoted to worldly authority, he asserts that
"the highest honor that obedience renders
is to recognize government as God's work
and gift, to thank God for His goodness,
1

Calvin asserts this in the lns1ilu1111 of 1h11
Chrislitm Religion, III, xix, 15, while the principle is asserted in numerous places in Luther's
works. A good source of Luther's position is
found in his Commsnhff"1 on GIIUllums of 1535
D. MtWlin Lu1h11r1 Wnk11, 40 I (Weimar: Her:
mann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1911), 210.
8

D11 tlroil tl111 mogisw1111 "" lll11, mbi11e1s,

p. 3.
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and to pray that government and rulers be
lead and protected by God against Satan." 7
The extension of the theological principle into practical politics emerges in the
thought of Beza as he moves on in his
monograph to focus his discussion on the
obedience to be rendered to magistrates.e
Melanchthon is not nearly so precise. In
the Lutheran Confessions Melanchthon
contributes to some confusion, for he fails
clearly to define what he means by government.9 Indeed a variety of terms is used
without any attempt at closer definition:
,politia, oeconomia, ,-esp1'blica, societas
cwilis, inipen11,m, regn,,m, magistrat11,s, status
civilis.10 The underlying idea to be found
in this indiscriminate use of terms is the
idea of legitimacy.11
Beyond such general assertions, Melanchthon employs the analogy of marriage, arguing that marriage is also one of
the good ordinances of God, and that man
should recognize that it, like government,
reflects God's goodness and mercy.12 F.rom
1 Loci Comm#nes,

"Von weltlicher Obrigkeit," IV, 376. Cf. also Melanchthon's remarks
in the Augsburg Confession: "All government
in the world and all established rule and laws
are good ordinances created and ordained by
God" ( AC XVI, 1). "They are God's good
creatures and divine ordinances" (Apology,
XVI) . Melanchthon calls them bon11 opn11 Dei.
8 See Beza's second question: Whether a
magistrate is held .responsible to render account
of all his laws to his subjeas? Du drou, p. 5.
9 Particularly the Augsburg Confession and
the Apology, both of which issue from the pen
of Melanchthon, the former in 15 30, the latter
adopted by the Lutheran Estates at Schweinfurt
in 1532, as a defense and an explanation of the
Confession, exhibit this.
10 Cf. Apology, XVI, 5-8.
11 See Edmund Schlink, Theolog1 of 1hs L#lhntm Conf11ssions (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg
Press, 1961), pp. 248-49.
12 Loci, p. 359.
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this Melanchthon deduces that God will
protect and uphold government, as He does
"life, the judiciary, punishment, just wars
... and many useful arts and vocations." 13
That God upholds and sustains the political order can be demonstrated, according
to Melanchthon, by the fact that even after
tyrants fall, God restores order through
men like Themistocles, Solon, Scipio, Augustus, and Constantine. Further proof can
be found for God's sustenance in the fact
that although monarchomachs seem to escape punishment, justice ultimately catches
up with them.H
There is considerable agreement between Melanchthon and Beza with regard
to the function of political authority. Both
assert that the ultimate purpose of the
political order is not merely peace and
tranquility, but service to God and a contribution to His glory.115 However, Melanchthon does not go much beyond this
assertion, for he feels that the function is
carried out when government maintains
peace, order, and justice through godly
laws and with punishment meted out in
love.16 Perhaps it is a reflection of his
benign personality and the peaceful times
in which he lived that Melanchthon concerns himself primarily with government
as it performs pacific funaions. Beza, however, writing in the wake of the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, devotes the
heart of his argument to demonstrating
that resistance to tyranny is legitimate and
not to be confused with resistance to God.17
Beza finds the funaion of authority deta loci, p. 360.
Loci, p. 362.
11 Lori, p. 373; D• df'OU, p. 65.
1e loci, p. 372.
1T D• Moil, p. 38.
H
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scribed primarily in the first table of the
Law, while Melanchthon emphasizes the
responsibilities of the second table. Melanchthon is aware that authority and government must give attention to the first
table and be concerned about idolatry,
heresy, and false docuine, if peace in the
theological as well as the political sense is
to be maintained.18 Yet he asserts that
"temporal power does not protea the soul,
but • . . [it proteas] body and goods." 10
In the Apology Melanchthon insists that
the purpose of the government is not to
proclaim the Triune God, but is rather to
be God's agent for maintaining justice and
order. God wants the "civil discipline to
resuain the unspiritual, and to preserve it
he has given laws, learning, teaching, governments and penalties." 20 In the 1555
revision of the Loci, Melanchthon asserted
that for the maintenance of peace secular
authority is responsible to maintain both
tables of the Law and could punish abuses
of the first table as well as the second.21
But beyond this assertion, he failed to
evolve a definite program of aaion or a
set of conditions under which such aaion
might be undertaken.

THE ROLB OF V.OCAnON
One of Luther's prominent theological
principles is the idea of vocation.22 Ac-

cording to Luther, a vocation is a station
which is by nature helpful to others if it
is followed. It is not confined to any particular occupation, but is rather a condition
in which a person .finds himself and in
which he can serve God by serving his
fellowmen. 23 Melanchthon takes the next
step in evolving a political ideology and
distinguishes between the office or station
which an individual holds and his person.
He argues that although one may well be
disuessed with a person in public office,
one must nonetheless still honor his position, for "it is the function of the vocation
to promote good customs, peace, unity, law,
order, and justice." 24
Persons who hold these positions, such
as lords and professional servants, are to
uphold law and order. However, they are
still subordinate to the functions of law,
order, and justice and should practice
obedience thereto and not destroy the
peace. This simple concept constitutes for
him the political societas.25 There is, however, no gradation of responsibility or resuiaion of obligation to be correlated with
graded roles fiowing from particular vocations. One either belongs to the Obrigkeit,
or one does not. Each is to serve according
to the vocation he possesses. The apostles
and prophets urge obedience to this order
of society. In terms of his vocation one is

18

Lori, p. 372.
AC XXVIII, 11.
20 Ap IV, 22-23.
21 Lon, pp. 312-13.
22
Luther himseU raises the quesdon of
vocadon directly in his Kireh,nposlills, WA 10 I
1, 308--9, when he comments on the meaning of the term in connection with 1 Cor. 7 :20.
The fruitfulness of Luther's suggestion is attested by the m1dies that bave been made of it.
By way of example, see Gustav Wingren Lll18

,1,.,. n

Voulion, tram. Carl Rasmussen (Phila-
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delphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957). Also Karl
Holl, Dis G•sehieh1s tlss W Miss Bll'lllf (Erlangen, 1928); Oliver Rupprecht, "A Remedy
for Modern Chaos - Luther's Concept of Our
Calling," CoNCORDIA THBOLOGICAL MONTHLY,
XXII ( 1951) , 820-48; Einar Billing, "Our
Calling," trans. Conrad Bergendoff (Rock
Island: Augustana Book Concern, 1950).
28

See Commffll-, on 1hs SMmon

011

lhs

Mo,m1, WA 32 I, 390-91.
241 Loci, p. 360.
21

Ibid.
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held to uphold the peace, while one may
at the same time curse and punish the
person in authority- as in the case of
Belshazar or the tyrant Nero.26
In the Du dtroit Beza distinguishes precisely between vocations and their par.:.
ticular responsibilities. Early in the traa 27
he affirms the significance of one's vocation when considering whether obedience
should be rendered to impious commands.
Later in the tract he draws the nice distinctions between private persons, who
have no rights against tyranny, the inferior
magistrates, who have the right to take
stop-gap action, and the higher magistrates,
who are ordained to bridle the king. 28
Whereas, then, neither Luther nor Melanchthon makes nice distinctions based on
the idea of vocation, it remained for Beza
to elaborate this idea and to work out a detailed program of action that was both
logical and utilitarian and that suited his
purpose well in providing a basis for resistance against tyranny.
OBEDIENCE

Both Luther and Calvin have much to
say about the importance of obedience to
government. Luther is patently clear on
this question when in his Commenta,, on
Psalm 82 he writes that since the political
authority is God's servant and representative, by being obedient to it we are being
obedient to God Himself. Men ought to
obey (rulers) as His officers and be subject to them with all fear and reverence as
28

Loci, p. 361.
D• tlroil, p. 3.
28 The sixth section of the D• tlroil is devoted to this problem and to examples in which
various kinds of action ensue from vocational
roles, pp. 22-25.
27
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to God Himself.29 This meant that even
a bad ruler, a tyrant, must be obeyed. Calvin agrees with this proposition, holding
that even bad governments are an expression of God's will for the good of man.
The antithesis, as Calvin sees it, is between
government and a lack of government. For
him no government is totally bad, and any
government, however corrupt, is better
than no government at all. 'The form of
civil government, whatever deformity and
corruption it may have, is always better
than the absence of princely authority." 80
Luther argues that man should be grateful
for good government, but also reminds his
readers that no tyranny can express a
greater judgment than our sins deserve.31
Melanchthon is consistent with the position of Luther and Calvin, urging that
Christians have the obligation in keeping
with the prayerful obedience of faith in
the Gospel "to be subjea to civil authority
and obey its commands and laws in all that
can be done without sin." 32 In the Loci
he holds that such obedience is to be concrete obedience to the commands of government, for it is the vocation to which
the individual is obedient, not the person.
That is why Melanchthon can say: "Reasoned disobedience against authority is a
damning sin. This is true because God
has given the control of the political realm
Martin Luther, Pslllm 82, American Edition, 13 (Sr. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1961), 44.
80 John Calvin, "Commentaries on the First
Epistle of Peter," Commtmlar#s on lh• Clllholk Bpis1'811 trans. John Owen
Rapids:
(Grand
William B. Eerdrnans Publishing Co., 1948) 1
p. 821.
31 Luther, Von dtm glllM W .,.,1.,,, WA 6,
29

259.
82

AC XVI, 6 (German); see ApXVI,3.

5

Concordia Theological Monthly, Vol. 41 [1970], Art. 3

BEZA AND MELANCHTHON ON POLITICAL OBLIGATION

32

to rulers.••• Christianity gives worldly
authorities their highest dues. . . • St. Paul
speaks of the station, not the person." 33
Melanchthon goes so far as to argue that
rulers themselves are to be subservient to
their office. 'They are subordinate to their
function-law, order, and justice, and
practice obedience thereto." 34
Elements of this position are found also
in Beza. He argues that princes are to be
subservient to their vocation, for "when
a prince has published good edicts authorizing the exercise of pure religion, princes
are held above all others to observe
them." 85 Beza states that private persons
have no authority to take law into their
own hands when they disagree with public policy. Even when against their consciences they are commanded to commit
idolatry, private persons must either suffer
the consequences of disobedience patiently
or emigrate.36 Beza emphasizes that private persons are to stay within the bounds
of their vocation, and that their vocation
does not authorize anything but obedience
to authority. To support this position, Beza
notes that Christ and the apostles suffered
under abusive edicts of Roman emperors
without resorting to arms.37 But beyond
these limitations placed on private persons,
Beza still could rely on his magistrates for
action.
TuB LIMITS TO 0BBDIENCB

Luther has often been charged with advocating a quietistic attitude toward every
kind of political authority, including tyr88

M
815
86
87

Loci, p. 370.
Loci, p. 360.
D11 d,,oil, 67 :21.
D11 tlroil, 16:20, 67:17.
D11 d,,oi,, 68:S.
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anny. It must be noted from the outset
that his is a theological position first and
foremost, not a position of political expediency or wisdom. Luther's position is sunply that men must obey constituted authority unless its demands are clearly in
disagreement with God's Word. Disobedience is never justified simply because the
demand of constituted authority causes the
individual suffering or inconvenience. Yet,
even for Luther there are circumstances in
which disobedience would be permitted:
Thus, if a prince desired to go to war, and
his cause was manifestly unrighteous, we
should not follow him nor help him at
all; since God has commanded that we
should not kill our neighbor nor do him
injustice. Likewise, if he bade us bear
false witness, steal, lie, or deceive or the
like. Here we ought to give up goods,
honor, body and life that God's commandments may stand.BB
For Luther disobedience is also justifiable when the secular powers step out of
their proper realms and presume to prescribe matters of belief and worship contrary to God's Word, thus claiming to "lord
it over man's conscience and faith, and put
the Holy Spirit to school according to
their mad brains." 39 However, Luther's
idea of disobedience is always a passive
one. It proposes no program of action to
remedy an intolerable political condition
beyond that of passive resistance or suffering.
Calvin shares the position with Luther
that the first principle of political obligation is one of obedience." Yet he says: 'We
are subject to men who rule over us, but
11

88

WA 6,265.
Luther, Vo• wsllliehu ObrigkBil, WA
11,246.
89
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only in the Lord. If they command anything against Him, let us not pay the least
regard to it." 40 The point of Calvin's posi..
tion is that the criterion for justified disobedience is not simply the individual's
personal conscience and pious feelings, but
rather convictions rooted in the Word of
God. It, too, is a passive resistance.
Thus both Luther and Calvin agree that
while disobedience is allowable, violent resistance never is. The alternatives seem
relatively simple: one might escape suffering in persecution by emigrating or, if
.Bight is inadvisable or impossible, one
must simply suffer, refusing to obey the
illegitimate commands and refusing to
disobey God by violent resistance to secular authority. Both Luther and Calvin
leave open, however, a small loophole
which seems to provide a conditional justification to resistance in clearly defined circumstances. Luther admitted late in life
that the electoral princes might offer legitimate resistance to imperial law.41 Calvin
asserted also that elected magistrates in the
service of a licentious king were to withstand in their capacity the .fierce licentiousness of princes. Failure to do so would
make them "guilty of criminal breach of
faith because they deceitfully betray the
. liberty of the people, of which they know
themselves the divinely appointed guardians." 42
The position of Melanchthon and that
Calvin, Inslilules, IV, xx, 31.
41 See Hans Baron, "Religion and Politics
in the German Imperial Cities During the
Reformation," The English His1orical Rt111it1UJ,
LIi (July 1957), 422-24; H. Richard Klann,
"Luther on War and Revolution," CONCORDIA
THBOLOGICAL MONTHLY, XXV (1954), 353
to 366.
42 Calvin, lns1i1111e11 IV, xx, 31.
40
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of the Lutheran Confessions is very close
to that of Luther. In the Augsburg Confession Melanchthon writes: "Accordingly
Christians are obliged to be subject to civil
authority and obey its commands and laws
in all that can be done without sin. But
when commands of the civil authority cannot be obeyed without sin, we must obey
God rather than men." 43 In the Loci he
points out that obedience is contingent
upon righteousness and proper laws. Thus,
"when however Nero decrees that one
practice idolatry, then St. Paul is not speaking to the point [in Romans 13]." 44
Again it is disobedience, not resistance,
that Melanchthon advocates. For he says
that when a worldly authority orders something against God, one must refuse to obey.
One should abstain as the three men of
Babylon who refused to carry out Nebuchadnezzar's decree. So one must not
assist in the murder of innocents, even as
in Melanchthon's day intellectuals remained
silent out of fea1: contrary to their conscience.45 Melanchthon cites numerous examples from history which he believes
serve to underscore God's concern for the
vocations of authority. When individuals
have exceeded their bounds or commanded
wrongly, God's judgment has ultimately
rested upon them in the form of some
personal judgment, or through the person
of some avenger who overthrew the government of a sinful king.
Melanchthon saw the Turks as the big
threat. In this connection he assens: 'The
Mohammedan kingdom, founded on murder and slander of God's name, is rejected
AC XVI, 6 (German); see Scblink's discussion of this topic, pp. 263-68.
44 Loci, p. 371.
41S Loci, p. 271.
48
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by God and will therefore not swallow the
church, will also be punished, as the
prophet Daniel assures us. This is said so
that we do not despair and are not moved
by its brilliance and its power. Do not give
homage to this kingdom, as to other kingdoms, but pray to God against the whole
Mohammedan kingdom." 46 Indeed, like
Luther, Melanchthoo had no positive program of tesistance in his theology other
than that of cursing persons and praying
God for deliverance. He proposed no institutions through which tesistaoce could be
effected, nor did he suggest a program of
action.
It was Beza who worked out a detailed
program of resistance against tyranny. The
plan was present germinally in Luther and
Calvin, for both emphasize that rulers were
to be subservient to the laws they issued.
The person was subservient to the office
he held. Working from this position, Beza
also asserted that rulers were held to observe edicts, particularly those authorizing
the exercise of pure religion. At this point
Beza leaned heavily on the contemporary
concept of contract-that rulers and subjects were bound by the obligations of contraet in regard to the observance of laws.
Revocation of laws was permissible only
through the process whereby they had been
established.41 Failure to observe such procedures was violation of contract, as Calvin had suggested, and therefore manifest
tyranny which could, under certain conditions, be resisted by force. Such an idea of
contract was novel to the theological argument of obedience.
For Be7.a it becomes a matter of persons
and procedures. When manifest tyranny
"

Lad, pp. 379-80.

" D• tlroil, 67 :24.
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becomes evident, private persons should
complain to the inferior magistrate. He,
in turn, could try to have the Estates General called together. The Estates, as superior magistrates and as protectors of the
contract between people and king could, in
the name of order, depose the king for
tyranny. They were not, however, to act
bastily. Tyranny had to be manifest; all
other attempts - reason, persuasion, and
good counsel- had to be exhausted first.
The means employed had to be expedient.
Beza's argument was logical and consistent
with the theological position of Luther and
Calvin. It took into account the role and
obligation of the lower magistrates, something that Luther never defined and that
Calvin had only suggested. It permitted
positive action by an institution in society
which was charged with a given responsibility- that of protecting the vested interests of the people.
Beza answered questions that the Lutheran reformers had not asked, or at least
his answer contained principles that would
have been unsuitable in the political circumstances of Luther. Melanchthon contented himself with defining the role of
a magistrate in these words: 'When you
think of a magistrate, draw a mental picture of a man holding the sword in one
hand, the Ten Commandments in the other.
After the fashion of Aristotle: magiswatus
esl custos legis." 48 He did not envision
duties for a magistrate beyond those of
discipline and peace, and these functions
he exercised only over those under his immediate authority.
Melanchthon has often been accused of
conciliation, mediation, and concession. He
48

Laci, p. 372.
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was, after all, the quiet reformer, the
scholar, not the fulminator. Franz Hildebrandt captures an insight into Melanchthon's position when he says of Melanchthon's course:
This course was dictated not only by
historical necessity: the desire to avoid
both hierarchy and anarchy in politics,
though obviously accentuated by the warning examples of Rome on the one side and
Anabaptist Munster on the other was a
sound theological motive, "For the Kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but
righteousness, and peace and joy in the
Holy Ghost...." The adversaries were in
constant danger of confusing that proportion, either by quietist retreat from, or

35

by theocratic invasion of, the secular
"order." 49

For Melanchthon the Christian was part
of two kingdoms, and there was little
connection between the two. Let him
quietly accept his obligations in both. Beza
established the connection. Even a Christian had certain kinds of recourse open to
him. Beza's position is then a logical extension of the position of Calvin, a consequence of the position of Luther's principle of vocation, and an answer to a political
question that Melanchthon never asked.

St. Paul, Minn.
48

Hildebrandt, p. 56.
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